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Abstract: Across the globe, disasters – both natural and man-made – have 
threatened humanity. These disasters had grave and devastating impact on 
human life, infrastructure, and the environment as evidenced by the February 
2000 Cyclone Eline and March 2019 Cyclone Idai. This research sought to 
investigate the Department of Civil Protection`s (DCP) capacity in national 
disaster management. The research examines how the DCP handled cyclones 
from 2000-2019 in Chimanimani District. Organisational capacity was 
assessed on the basis of its core principles which are: leadership, management 
and operations, community engagement, service and evaluation. The study 
discovered that inadequate financial and human resources, poor emergency 
response systems, weak learning and lessons drawing, reactive disaster 
management, weak pre-disaster management community engagement, poor 
reconstruction and failure to harmonise military and DCP operational 
structures are factors undermining DCP`s capacity for national disaster 
management. The research recommends that government should avail 
adequate resources, DCP should be proactive in disaster management, should 
openly contract-out reconstruction works, and collaborate with universities to 
strengthen organisational learning capacity, align military and DCP 
operational structures and processes and let Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGO) distribute food and other humanitarian aid.  
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1. Introduction 
The Across the global spectrum, disasters – both natural and man-made – have threatened humanity. 
The World Risk Report [1] says that global statistics, both from the past and future, show an increase 
in natural disasters. This is because global annual economic impact allied with disasters were 
estimated at around US$ 75.5 billion in the 1960s, US$ 138.4 billion in the 1970s, US$ 213.9 billion 
in the 1980s, US$ 659.9 billion in the 1990s, US$ 374 billion in 2011, US$ 117 billion in 2016 and  
US$ 75 billion in 2020 [2]. The calamities that have threatened humanity include floods, earthquakes, 
tornados, cyclones to mention but a few [1]. These disasters had grave and devastating impact on 
human life, infrastructure, and the environment [3]. Developed, developing and even resource-
constrained states have set up organisations meant to deal with disasters. To this end, Zimbabwe has 
the Department of Civil Protection (DCP), nonetheless the organisation has constantly faced criticism 
over how it manage disasters. This is because there is a discrepancy to organisational objectives and 
performance. It is against this background that this research intends to interrogate the DCP`s 
organisational capacity for national disaster management using cyclones in the Eastern Highlands 
particularly cyclone Eline and Idai so as to proffer remedial actions.  
In an effort to curb the devastating effects of disasters, Zimbabwe enacted the Civil Protection Act 
(Chapter 10:06) in 1986 which repealed the Civil Defence Act of 1982 [4], [5]. The legal framework 
gave room for the establishment of the Department of Civil Protection (DCP) formerly known as Civil 
Protection Unit (CPU) which seeks to bring normalcy to affected areas and families [4]. The legal 
instrument defined the operations of the DCP and clearly outlined what is expected of it [4]. The DCP 
is tasked with the responsibility of establishing emergency plans, post disaster and recovery 
management plans, the Department is under the Ministry of Local Government [4] [6].  According to 
the DCP E-Service Charter “the key result area of the Department is Disaster Risk Management 
(DRM) which entails a spectrum of activities involving prevention/mitigation of disaster risks, 
preparedness planning, timely early warning and response to rehabilitate affected elements” [6].   
The mandate of the DCP is overall mobilisation and coordination of DRM stakeholders from the 
private and public sectors. The vision of the Department is to promote the, “prevalence of a culture of 
risk aversion and disaster resilience, strengthened coping capacities and optimal disaster response 
within the context of sustainable development in all sectors, institutions and at risk communities in 
Zimbabwe” [6]. Central to the mission of DCP is the coordination and promotion of strategic planning 
for disasters at the community, local authority and national level in a bid to promote “optimal 
emergency preparedness and disaster prevention in Zimbabwe” [6].  
At its establishment, the Department received warm welcome from the nation at large, which 
viewed it as a vehicle of bringing back normalcy and comfort in times of disaster thereby restoring 
hope to the people. However, the organisation in the past has been accused of constantly failing to 
give hope, comfort and relief to the citizens in times of disasters, this is because of its alleged poor 
post-disaster management. According to the Department of Civil Protection, Cyclone Eline affected 
2.7 million people directly or in directly in the Southern and Eastern part of Zimbabwe, among them 
were vulnerable groups. The scale or magnitude of the impact has been describe as “huge” with a total 
cost of US$ 3,160,799.00 leaving many homeless at the mercy of poverty [7]. The Cyclone Eline 
floods of  February 2000 left approximately over 250, 000 people affected, 90 people dead and the 
destruction of  about US$ 7.5 million worth of goods [4] [8] [9].  
In addition, the World Food Programme Zimbabwe [10], citing Timber Producers Association, 
noted that 3340 hectares of timber was damaged valued at US$10 000 000 which is one year’s 
produce and this had a devastating impact on the livelihoods of the people. Infrastructure in Mutare 
and Chipinge was destroyed e.g. granaries, bridges, schools, telecommunications lines, roads clinics. 
Electricity and telecommunication lines are among other essential facilities that were affected by the 
cyclone [10] [4]. Estimation rehabilitation costs of irrigation schemes and water resources was US$ 2 
042 047 [10].  Approximately over 16000 chickens, 13000 goats, 2000 cattle and 1000 donkeys died 
due to the cyclone [10]. 
The DCP was warned of the Cyclone by the Zimbabwe Meteorological Services on the 15th of 
February 2000 and disseminated the information on newspapers, radio and television two days before 
the Cyclone. The information lacked vital preparedness and mitigation measures that the recipients 
could have implemented, and the organisations was also criticized for poor dissemination coverage 
which gravely affected their disaster mitigation mandate [10]. The other disasters that the organisation 
also dealt with include Cyclone Japhet in 2003, Cyclone Cela in 2013, Tokwe Mukusi and 
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Tsholotsholo floods in 2014, Cyclone Dineo in 2017, Cyclone Idai in 2019 and various serious  road 
accidents to mention but a few [4].  
However, common to all is the DCP`s alleged inability to robustly handle the aftermaths of the 
disasters. Approximately 250 000 people were affected by the recent Cylone Idai; 120 000 children 
affected, 154 deaths and 189 missing mid-March 2019 [11]. Mavhunga [12] noted that by the end of 
March 2019, the death toll had reached 181 with more than 40 000 in need of food assistance and 7 
000 had their houses destroyed. According to UNICEF Zimbabwe Report: 7 [13] “as of 14 April, 334 
people had been reported dead and over 257 people were reported missing due to the cyclone”, 
270,000 people were affected, including 129,600 children.  
The DCP has structures at national, provincial and district level but nothing at ward level when the 
latter is the most affected level as evidenced by Ngangu area in Chimanimani, in the Cyclone Idai. 
However, after Cyclone Idai, the DCP set district command centre in Chimanimani and Chipinge with 
Mutare being the subnational and provincial command centre coordinating all efforts aimed at 
managing the disaster [11]. The silence of DCP in disseminating information prior to Cyclone Idai 
raises questions about the organisation’s capacity in disaster management. It may also show that the 
organisation learned little in previous cyclones like Cyclone Eline where poor information 
dissemination and coverage was said to be one of the major factors that led the Cyclone to catch the 
citizens unprepared [10]. In a bid to revamp the DCP the government made disaster management a 
vital component of vision 2030, it is also engraved in the Transitional Stabilisation Policy (TSP) [14]. 
The European Union (EU) is said to have found national disaster management budget wanting and 
availed €7 million, since in the 2019 budget the DCP was allocated only $ 2 335 000 [15] [16]. It is 
against this background that the research seeks to investigate organisational capacity for disaster 
management. 
 
2. Literature Review and Analytical Framework 
2.1. Organisational Capacity 
For Cox et al [17] citing Yu-Lee [18], organisational capacity entails an “organisation`s ability to 
perform work”. Eisinger [19] called it the empowering dynamics that enable an organisation to 
undertake its task and achieve goals and objectives.  In the public sector realm, organisational 
capacity entails government`s aptitude, capability to marshal, direct, develop as well as control 
information, human, physical and financial resources in a manner that advances organisational 
objectives and goals [20]. In short, it denotes the organisation`s shrewdness in directing and 
monitoring resources in a swift manner that allows it to deal with challenges in a timely and effective 
way [21], [22]. It is imperative to note that organisational capacity varies across organisations and 
sectors, as various sectors are driven by a myriad of differing arrays of incentives, while private 
entities aim to increase profits, public entities prioritise efficiency in public service delivery [23] [24]. 
Conceptualisation of capacity even in one sector differs depending on the vision, size, mandate and 
department. Nonetheless, organisational capacity can be measured in terms of human capital, skills, 
resources, adaptive and administrative capabilities [23] [25] [26] [27].  Morgan [28] propounded that 
capacity is established by five vital capabilities which to a lesser and greater extent are visible in all 
organisations. The five capabilities are: capability to integrate, adapt, relate, act and generate 
development results.  The capabilities are sustained by the following pillars of organisational capacity 
which includes leadership capacity, management and operations capacity, community engagement 
capacity, service capacity and evaluation capacity.  
 
2.2. Disaster Management  
Disaster management denotes the art and science of managing resources, structures and 
responsibilities aimed at addressing all forms of catastrophes [29]. It is also known as emergency 
management [30]. Kawara [31] noted that disaster management embodies response, recovery, 
rehabilitation and mitigation, all aimed at minimizing disaster aftermaths. The World Risk Report [1] 
reinforces the above view by pointing out that central to disaster management are policies, 
administrative and operative decisions and actions aimed at curbing and reducing the impact of 
catastrophes. It is infused with human rights values and humanitarian principles that seek to honour 
human dignity and restore normalcy in affected areas [32]. 
The management of disaster is a mammoth task, as such it requires a comprehensive management 
cycle that includes the shaping and development of public policies as well as plans that lessen disaster 
effects on infrastructure, people and property. Disaster management follows a six-stage cycle which 
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embodies disaster impact, response, recovery, development, mitigation and preparedness [4] [33] [34] 
[35]. For Carter [36] disaster management cycle includes disaster impact, response, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, development, prevention, mitigation and preparedness. The disaster management cycle 
varies in terms of terminology in its structures and stages but common to all is the continuum element 
meant to minimise disaster effect. All disaster management cycles have two distinct phases which are 




Pre-disaster Phase Post-disaster Phase  
 
Figure 1. The Disaster Management Cycle [36] 
 
 
2.3. Case Studies  
2.3.1. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the USA  
President Carter on the 1st of April 1979 established the FEMA [39] [40] [41]. The FEMA was tasked 
to deal with Federal disaster and provide guidance, comfort and normalcy in times of crises [39]. 
FEMA has successfully fulfilled this task though it is not immune to challenges. The FEMA has 
played a crucial role in some of the most devastating crises, for example, the 1993 Great Midwest 
Floods, the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, the Alfred Murrah building terrorist attack of 1995, the 2001 
September terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre (WTC), 2005 Hurricane 
Katrina, the 2018 Maryland flooding and Hurricane Florence as well as the 2019 Midwestern and 
Mississippi river floods [39] [42]. The FEMA has made use of the National Preparedness System 
(NPS) to promote robust disaster management [43]. At the core of NPS is the Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) which helps the organisation build its preparedness 
capacity by systematically examining possible emergencies thereby revamping its mitigation 
measures [43]. 
 
2.3.2. The Central Disaster Management Council (CDMC) in Japan 
Des Marais et al [44] propounded that “Japan is an epicentre for natural disasters” because, the 
country is situated on numerous dynamic “faults, having multiple active volcanoes, experiencing 
typhoons every summer”. The nation of Japan is subjected to hurricanes and floods and as such, it is a 
nation that cannot survive without a viable disaster management [44] [45]. In the 1940s and 1950s, 
Japan was constantly ravaged by earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes, and typhoons to mention but a 
few. The 1959 Isewan typhoon had grave devastating effects, thus in an effort to curb such effects the 
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was enacted in 1961 [44] [45] [46]. The enactment of the 
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act paved way for the establishment of the CDMC [44]. The CDMC 
was given a mammoth task of disaster management and capacity building, ensuring national disaster 
preparedness and possible comprehensive countermeasures [47]. The CDMC has been glorified for its 
role in disaster management as well as its ability to examine its performance and learn from its 
mistakes. A good example is a series of performance reviews after the 2011 Great East Earthquake 
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CDMC has a viable evaluation, learning and adaptive capacity which are key fundamental pillars of 
organisational capacity for national disaster management.   
 
3. Methodological Framework 
The research used the qualitative paradigm to investigate organisational capacity for national disaster 
management. The qualitative paradigm allowed the inquiry to ask questions the following questions: 
What is organisational capacity for national disaster management? What is the legal framework 
governing the operation of Zimbabwe’s DCP? What are the strengths and shortcomings that the DCP 
is encountering in national disaster management? What remedial actions can be adopted to increase 
organisational capacity in managing national disasters? The study focused primarily on cyclones in 
Eastern Zimbabwe from 2000. It benefited from purposive and convenience sampling. Documentary 
review, key informant interviews and observations were used to gather data. The research made use of 
content analysis. Ethical considerations such as participants` right to privacy, confidentiality, 
anonymity and informed consent were upheld.   
 
4.1. Findings and Analysis 
4.1.1. The DCP`s Capacity for National Disaster Management  
4.1.1.1. Leadership Capacity  
The study discovered that the DCP has a viable strategic apex that comprises members from various 
government departments and private entities who bring in different expertise. The National Civil 
Protection Committee (NCPC), which is chaired by the Director in terms of section 4 (2) (a) of the 
Civil Protection Act (Chapter 10:06), which is the strategic apex responsible for deliberating on 
matters affecting the Department and how it can overcome those challenges. According to the 
Chairman of DCP Chipinge, who demonstrated knowledge and experience about NCPC`s functions, 
“the NCPC has the power to draft long-term and short-term goals for the Department”. The Chairman 
of DCP Chipinge noted that the strategic apex is complemented by the organisational structure. The 
organisation adopted the machine bureaucracy structure with a “clearly defined hierarchy, 
formalisation in many procedures, standardisation and a centralised decision-making system”. He said 
the machine bureaucracy structure enables the operations of the DCP which are “interdisciplinary and 
multi-sectoral in scope and promote formal planning and systematic audits for organisational optimal 
efficiency in national disaster management”. 
However, the Head of the DCP Chipinge Shelter Cluster and Head of DCP Chimanimani Social 
Welfare Cluster noted that the DCP`s leadership capacity has remained questionable as it has been 
found wanting many times and recently in the Cyclone Idai. They posed rhetorical questions in their 
narrative, “How can we say the organisation has a viable leadership capacity when some of the 
soldiers deployed to help during Cyclone Idai refused to report to the District Development 
Coordinator (DDC) who is the DCP chairman saying we report to our superiors in the military?”. 
Therefore, this had a negative impact on the coordination of emergence rescue mission as the lines of 
command at times where not harmonised. Nonetheless, the research noted that this problem is 
inherent in the DCP every time the military is deployed to assist. According to the Head of DCP 
Chipinge Shelter Cluster and Head of DCP Chimanimani Social Welfare Cluster “the genes of this 
problem can be traced back to Cyclone Eline of 2000, Cyclone of Japhet 2003 up to every national 
disaster that military personnel were deployed to assist”. Another rhetoric question which was asked 
is “where is leadership capacity when the organisation struggles to adapt and coordinate effectively its 
operations and human resources?” The study discovered that DCP`s struggle to “adapt and coordinate 
effectively its operations and human resources” was due to organisational inability to synthesise 
military and DCP personnel, owing to the military organisational protocol and pride.  
 
4.1.2. Management and Operations Capacity  
Management and operations capacity are closely related to leadership capacity. The former is more 
concerned about the organisation’s ability to recruit, develop and retain talent while the latter focuses 
on directing and controlling the organisation through crafting sound and unambiguous policies. 
Prentice and Brudney [23] stated that management and operations capacity primarily focus on 
“internal-facing capacities” which encompass the ability of a corporate to recruit, develop and retain 
talent, manage its finances as well as maintenance of vital infrastructure and systems. According to 
the Head of the DCP Chipinge Health Cluster, “during and after Cyclone Idai DCP Chimanimani for a 
month had no management and operational capacity”. This is because the entire DCP Chimanimani 
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administration and its four cluster committees which include Shelter, Water Sanitation and Roads, 
Relief and Psychological Services and Social Welfare “were locked down by the Cyclone”. This 
means they had little service to offer as it was the most affected district with most of its resources 
destroyed by the Cyclone. The magnitude of the cyclone was unbearable as most bridges and roads 
were damaged, for example, “Risutu Valley (Kopa) was totally inaccessible for DCP Chimanimani 
team to conduct emergence rescue missions”.  This gave “Chipinge DCP operational management of 
both districts for some time”. The Head of DCP Chipinge Health Cluster stated that, the DCP team 
from Chipinge became the “focal personnel in the coordination of rescue missions” which include 
temporary evacuation, immediate recovery and reconstruction, provision of all emergency services 
such as shelter, health, food, relief and psychological services with with “Makandi Estate in Chpinge 
providing airstrip and refuelling facilities for swift emergence management”. 
According to the Head of DCP Chipinge, the Shelter team managed to build more than 700 tents 
for emergence evacuation. The Head of DCP Chimanimani Shelter Cluster stated that, “though some 
of our areas were inaccessible our colleagues from DCP Chipinge did a marvellous job in evacuating 
the survivors and offering them temporary shelter in Risutu valley Kopa”. The Head of DCP 
Chimanimani Shelter Cluster noted that, “while we could not do much at the moment of the Cyclone 
as most of our resources were badly affected, we managed to put two hundred families into safety 
with the help of the Chimanimani Hotel management which opened their hotel for use”.  However, 
the Head of DCP Chimanimani Shelter Cluster argued that, “our efforts could not go beyond expected 
as we had some difficulties in man power and resources”. The challenges emanate from the fact that 
the Department has no “functional management operations capacity as it does not directly recruit, 
develop and retain talent at provincial and district level”.  
In addition, on the 7th of October 2019 the Head of the DCP Chipinge Relief and Psychological 
Service Cluster referred to loss of institutional memory due to personnel changes in the Department. 
“For example, the people that oversaw Cyclone Eline disaster of 2000 are not the same people 
overseeing Cyclone Idai”. The whole “DCPC has new people” and this has a negative impact on 
operational management and institutional memory as “there is no talent which has been retained”. The 
Department`s failure to recruit, develop and retain talent has gravely affected organisational 
prevention, mitigation and preparedness capacity for national disaster management. The Head of the 
DCP Chipinge Relief and Psychological Service Cluster noted that, “in as much as the District 
Subcommittee meets every month and as long as talent is not developed and retained the Department 
will always been incapacitated in times of national disaster management”.  
Management and operations capacity are not only limited to recruiting, developing and retaining of 
talent. They cover the organisation`s ability to manage its finances as well as maintenance of vital 
infrastructure and systems. According to the Head of Chimanimani DCP Health Cluster, “the 
Department still has a long way to go in this area”.  He noted that the management and operations 
capacity of DCP are being “affected by inadequate funds”. According to the Head of Chimanimani 
DCP Health Cluster, the Department has not received adequate funds from the state. Last year in 
November the Department had already exhausted its $3 000 000 budget allocation in dealing with a 
wave of fire that destroy property around the country and the cholera outbreak that left forty-seven 
dead.  Therefore, instead of raising DCP`s budget allocation, the government allocated only $2 335 
000 to the Department in the 2019 budget despite its $10 000 000 budgetary bid [15]. The budgetary 
allocation testifies to the government’s attitude towards national disaster management as the 
Department was given less than a quarter of what it had requested. This is an inherent problem, every 
year the Department faces budget constraints, despite the fact that the government made disaster 
management a vital component of vision 2030 [14].  
In addition, the study noted that in Chipinge and Chimanimani, DCP has no infrastructure and 
systems to maintain and use in times of disaster management which is specifically designated for the 
Department. The organisation relies on vehicles that it borrows from other government departments. 
However, at times the vehicles will be engaged in other activities. According to the Head of DCP 
Chimanimani Social Welfare Cluster, the Cyclone started “on Thursday 14 March 2019. Due to the 
fact that we do not have our own resources and cars we could not begin rescue operations until 
Monday 18 March 2019”. The Head of DCP Chipinge Shelter Cluster noted that, “on Friday 15 
March 2019, we only had an emergency meeting but no rescue operation was sanctioned as there were 
no adequate resources to do impact assessment”. This demonstrates organisational resource 
constraints in national disaster management. This narrative resonates with Risutu Valley (Kopa) 
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ZAOGA Pastor and Ngangu Primary School teacher who stated that, for four days, they felt as if the 
world has abandoned them as they were surrounded by floods with no communication to the world. 
 
4.1.3. Community Engagement Capacity 
Community engagement capacity is a vital component of national disaster management. It primarily 
focuses on how the organisation interacts with community partners, media, sponsors and other 
corporates in a bid to create a conducive environment to fulfil its goals and objectives [23]. The 
establishment of a robust community engagement is built upon four fundamental pillars which are: 
communication and advocacy, community partnerships, fund development and volunteer management 
[17], [27], [48]. In national disaster management community engagement is on two dimensions. The 
first dimension being pre-disaster management and the second dimension being post-disaster 
management. The community engagement capacity of the DCP in post-disaster management has been 
described as “great” while that of pre-disaster management was found to be “disastrous” by the Head 
of DCP Chimanimani Social Welfare Cluster. This is because the Department is in constant 
communication with survivors of Cyclone Idai.  
The Chimanimani Relief and Psychological team together with the Social Welfare team meet after 
every two weeks with survivors in Risutu (Kopa) and Ngangu, conducting various rehabilitation 
educational programs on how residents can overcome depression and nightmares that were brought by 
the grave impact of the Cyclone. According to the Heads of DCP Chimanimani Health team and 
Social Welfare team, “despite resource constraints we have continued offering our support to the 
residents”. Plan International, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Goal, Christian Care and World 
Vision have also played a significant role in offering the same services to the residents. The ability of 
the DCP to interact and partner with various organisations in times of disaster and after clearly 
demonstrate the organisation`s understanding of the fundamental pillars of community engagement 
capacity. The research noted that DCP has many weaknesses but post-disaster management 
community engagement has been done in “an acceptable manner that has facilitated a robust 
rehabilitation process” said a male Ngangu Primary School Teacher at Ngangu Township.  
The Shelter team from DCP Chimanimani has also played a significant role, in educating the 
residents of Ngangu and Risutu (Kopa) on how to build houses and identify areas which are likely to 
be affected by floods in the rainy season. The DCP conducted the meetings in partnership with 
various Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) which include Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JAIC), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Care International, Africa Ahead 
and Red Cross. The inclusion of NGOs shows a robust community engagement capacity which 
promotes intra- and inter-sectoral collaboration that is determined to ensure an optimum national 
disaster management.  
 
4.1.4. Service Capacity 
Service capacity refers to the corporate`s ability to design viable programs that respond to the needs 
of the customers, monitor and promote quality implementation as well as recalibrate the corporate`s 
activities to meet demand trends [23]. Regarding the DCP, service capacity means the department`s 
ability to design, implement and recalibrate pre-disaster and post-disaster management measures in a 
bid to curtail disaster. According one Africa Ahead Field Officer, the DCP`s service capacity “is weak 
if it has any”. The Field Officer noted that “there is a difference in having organisational management 
and service capacity; there can be an organisation but what good is it if it cannot fulfil its task”. The 
Field Officer expressed displeasure by arguing that DCP has become a “corporate dinosaur” which 
has neither coping nor adaptive capacity.   
According to an International Rescue Committee Research Officer, the DCP has good policies but 
lacks implementation capacity. The Head of DCP Chimanimani Health Cluster and DCP Chipinge 
Shelter Cluster reinforced the view of an International Rescue Committee Research Officer by stating 
that “Cyclone Idai came as a surprise and members of the District Committee met on the 11th, 14th 
and 15th of March 2019 by then it was too late to start initiating sound prevention, mitigation and 
preparedness implementation measures”. The DCP only issued warnings via mobile services. 
However, one of the major weakness of issuing warnings via mobile phone is that, there is an ongoing 
constant electricity interruption in the country thus many mobile phones might be off. Equally 
important to note is the fact there are some who might not be able to read. International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (ISDR) [49], Mhlanga et al [50], Kawara [31] and Mavhura [4] noted that disaster 
preparedness is capacity building, it entails predetermined measures and activities that are put in place 
Bismark Mutizwa. 
An Investigation into Organisation Capacity for National Disaster Management in Zimbabwe: The Case of the Department of Civil Protection. 
International Journal of Humanities, Management and Social Sciences, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 11-22, June 2021. DOI: 10.36079/lamintang.ij-humass-0401.207 
18 
to ensure optimum response. Disaster preparedness encompasses the issuance of early warnings, 
provisional and impermanent removal of property and people from an area that is exposed to threats. 
In line with this view and the narratives by the Heads of DCP Chimanimani Health Cluster and DCP 
Chipinge Shelter Cluster, the DCP only managed to issue warnings but did not provide impermanent 
removal of property and people from areas that were under threat.  According to the Head of DCP 
Chimanimani Shelter Cluster, “we did not even do risk mapping and zoning, which allows the 
organisation to do pre-impact assessments due to resource constraints”. A sign of poor service 
capacity being initiated by the unavailability of resources, had it done maybe it could have reduced 
the scale and magnitude of effects caused by Cyclone Idai.  
Moreover, emergence response was also poor, noted one male ZAOGA Deacon from Risutu 
Valley (Kopa).  It took four to five days for survivors to get help. However, according to the 
Chairman of DCP Chipinge which was in charge of emergency rescue missions in Risutu Valley 
(Kopa), “this was because of poor visibility due to bad weather, telecommunication and electrical 
lines had been affected, lack of vehicles (in-road and off-road) and resources that are specifically 
stationed for DCP activities”. Apart from vehicles the organisation did not have fuel for the vehicles 
they later mobilised from other government departments. All the DCP members Chipinge and 
Chimanimani except for two that the research failed to conduct interviews with, acknowledged their 
poor response but blamed it on lack of resources.  According to the Chairman of DCP Chipinge, “with 
the little resources we had, we tried our best”. Forty doctors from various organisations such as the 
Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Zimbabwe Medical Association 
(ZMA) and Premier Medical Services Investments (PMSI) were deployed to Skyline in Chimanimani, 
Chipinge Hospital and some in the field. However, measuring their best with the impact of Cyclone 
Idai, it can be said DCP is incapacitated and their service capacity need to be revamped for sound 
national disaster management.  
The research noted that in the most affected area, Risutu Valley (Kopa), there are some 
reconstruction activities underway. The ZNA and the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) have provided human and technological capital to speed up the reconstruction process. The 
study noted that on the 9th of October 2019, one bridge in Kopa just across the ZAOGA church was 
completed waiting for the official opening while the one which crosses Nyahonde River heading to 
Kurwaisimba was still under construction. Schools and a clinic have been reconstructed and normalcy 
in their operations was the order of the day. According to the female ZAOGA Pastor the 
reconstruction of schools and a clinic took four months, while the bridge took six months. 
Nonetheless, reconstruction process seemed to be focusing on bridges and schools which is quite 
reasonable but little has been done to the survivors who are still living in tents.  It is now nine months 
after the Cyclone and no permanent structure has been built for those living in tents, said one 
Assistant Field Officer from Plan International in Risutu Valley (Kopa). However, on the 25th of 
October Newsday carried an article which reinforced the findings of the research, noting that 
approximately “30 0000” people are still living in tents and might just be affected by the rains [51]. 
 
4.1.5. Evaluation Capacity 
Evaluation capacity forms the basis of viable national disaster management. It is through evaluation 
capacity that DCP can examine the department`s past performance in national disaster management 
and recalibrate its ongoing activities to create resilient system that has sound preventive, mitigation, 
preparedness, recovery, reconstruct and rehabilitation capacity. The study noted that the DCP has 
weak evaluation capacity. According to the Head of DCP Chimanimani Health Cluster, “we have no 
learning capacity. We have failed to learn from previous national disasters and cyclones that have 
affected Chimanimani District”. “The patterns of its poor national disaster management are visible 
everywhere; they have become a public secret”, said one female Ngangu Primary School Teacher at 
Ngangu Township. The female teacher noted that DCP dealt with Cyclone Eline in 2000, Cyclone 
Japhet in 2003, Cyclone Cela in 2013, Tokwe Mukosi and Tsholotsholo floods in 2014 and Cyclone 
Dineo in 2017. Nonetheless, the organisation learned little in all those disasters, consequently leading 
to service, leadership, management and operations incapacitation during Cyclone Idai.  
Gee and Ramuscak [52] stated that with evaluation inquiry and effective use of evaluative 
outcomes, an organisation establishes robust evaluation capacity which creates room for adaptive 
capacity. Evaluation capacity focuses on the organisations ability to gather data, determine the impact 
and examine the lessons learned to revamp the corporates performance [23]. Therefore, according to 
the Emergence Management Coordinator from Goal, the DCP`s weak evaluation capacity denies the 
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organisation the ability to learn from its mistakes, overcome challenges and strengthen its activities 
towards national disaster management.  
The Chairman of DCP Chipinge noted that, in as much as the survivors of Cyclone Idai and the 
nation at large say: 
“We have weak institutional memory and learning capacity, it would be fair if they 
consider that we are operating with inadequate resources. For example, in our budgetary 
bid for the year 2019 we requested $10 000 000 but only received $ 2 335 000 which is 
less than a quarter of our budgetary bid”. “This speaks volume to why we fail to conduct 
some of the scheduled or pre-planned post disaster management evaluations”. 
 
The use of the words “scheduled or pre-planned post disaster management evaluations” testifies to 
the planned post-disaster management evaluations which are interrupted by the unavailability of 
resources.  
 
4.2. Survivors’ Views on DCP`s Capacity 
All the interviewed survivors questioned the DCP`s capacity in national disaster management, 
common to the narratives of the survivors is DCP`s delay in emergence rescue missions which only 
came after seven days. The survivors also lamented how slow the reconstruction processes is, citing 
that they are still living in tents. According to a male Ngangu Primary School Teacher at some time, 
help was not being given to them fairly as partisan politics took centre stage in the distribution of food 
and clothes. Mafirakureva [53] reinforce the above view by questioning in what capacity was 
Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) members distributing food aid. For a 
Ngangu Shop owner, ZAOGA Deacon, “Mushikashika” (taxi) driver this brings into dispute DCP`s 
capacity in national disaster management as the presence of ZANU PF members in the distribution of 
food aid was meant to instil fear and force those who belong to other parties to join them.  All these 
narratives by survivors made the research to question DCP`s capacity. Although, the research did not 
find any direct link between DCP and partisan distribution of food, it`s failure to reprimand the 
present of political regalia in the distribution of food donations made, it’s independence and apolitical 
capacity to be questioned.  
 
5. Conclusion 
National disaster management in Zimbabwe has been gravely compromised by the DCP`s 
organisational capacity which has been found wanting every now and then. This is because there 
appears to be a discrepancy between the DCP`s performance and its mandate, which has 
consequentially made the organisation less effective. The organisational capacity of the DCP is 
compromised by a plethora of multifaceted and complementing dynamics as presented above. 
However, there is still room to reinvigorate DCP, this can be done by considering the following 
remedial actions. 
Few recommendations: 
1. Government Should Avail Adequate Resources   
The Government should avail sufficient financial resources to capacitate the DCP in its 
activities. The availability of adequate financial resources will smoothen the operations of 
DCP. There is need to purchase at least two earthmoving machines; a Grader and Front 
Loader, five off-road vehicles for each DCP office, from national, provisional and district. 
This will enable the organisation to implement swift coordination and response of rescue 
missions.  
2. There is need for DCP to recruit adequate workforce  
The research recommends the DCP to recruit more personnel, at least four to five individuals 
who are specially deployed to deal with disaster management at provincial and district levels 
and operate fulltime in the DCP office. These individuals will then become focal personnel in 
times of disaster management and it will lead to the creation of organisational specialisation 
capacity. Thus, skills and experience will be preserved for the betterment of the organisation 
and nation at large.  
3. Let Non-Governmental Organisations Distribute Food Aid 
The DCP should let NGOs distribute food and other humanitarian aid. NGOs have the 
resources and capacity to distribute food aid to survivors in times of disasters. It is imperative 
to note that they should not distribute food aid on partisan grounds and wearing political 
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regalia. Equally important is the need of the DCP to put in place preventive measures against 
partisan distribution of aid.  
4. DCP Should Be Proactive in its Disaster Management  
The DCP should utilise pre-disaster management processes to establish organisational 
capacity. Risk-zoning, pre-disaster impact assessment followed by temporary removal of 
people and property, should form the basis of proactive disaster management. The warning 
messages that it sent via various mobile operators should also give more information to the 
citizens on what they should do, who to call and where to go in times of disasters. 
5. DCP Should Contract-Out Reconstruction Works  
The DCP should engage other private stakeholders who have a reputable capacity in building 
resilient structures. Contracting out will bring the much-needed engineering expertise just like 
what the DCP did with bridges which were joint venture between the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) and Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) were done.  
6. Collaborate with Universities to Strengthen Organisational Learning Capacity  
The DCP should collaborate with Universities and encourage students both undergraduate and 
postgraduates to undertake research that deals with its operations. This is the easiest and 
cheapest way of conducting systematic evaluations and strengthening learning and coping 
capacity. In return the DCP should offer book prize awards to the best thesis so as to keep the 
morale and motivation among students. This was successfully done in Japan, Australia and 
Canada.  
7. Align Military and DCP Operational Structures and Processes 
The research proposes that, the Government should ensure that the DCP`s strategic apex the 
National Civil Protection Committee (NCPC) harmonise with military commanders on how 
best they can align DCP`s operational structures in times of disasters. This is to promote swift 
coordination of emergency rescue missions. It will also enhance DCP`s adaptive and coping 
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